This paper traces the emergence of social movement unionism in Hamburg, Germany, as labor's channels of influence have broken down and economic pressures have intensified. Trade unionists have responded to the privatization of the municipal hospitals by mobilizing members and building coalitions around issues beyond their members' immediate interests, including democracy and public service quality. Although the loss of union influence has facilitated social movement unionism, in East Germany economic crisis has had a demobilizing effect. 
In Germany, like many countries, unions have traditionally had two institutionalized ways to ratchet up labor standards: the industrial relations system and the political system. Both kinds of influence, however, have become less effective, as employers have created low-paying precarious jobs and state and local governments have excluded unionists from the policymaking process. Most policymakers have come to view the intensification of competition, the search for competitiveness, and the elimination of barriers to competition, including worker protections, as the keys to general well-being. Unions have had difficulty adapting.
For industrial relations theorists, this has come as a surprise. While comparative industrial relations scholars have long discussed Germany within the context of globalization, they have treated it as a "coordinated market economy." Global market pressures, in this scheme, are mediated by an institutional framework that produced both a rising standard of living for blue-collar workers and economic competitiveness. Trade unions played a crucial role establishing these institutions, extending them to East Germany, and reforming them in line with economic and political pressures. This connection to the political and industrial relations systems became central to trade union strategies and identities.
Recently, the institutional embeddedness of German unions has been undermined in two ways. First, in some places, in-firm cooperation has intensified, hardening the segments of the labor market, and leading to concession bargaining. This tends to undermine uniform wage and work times in industry, a central feature of employer-side coordination (Doellgast and Greer 2007; Thelen and Kume 2006) , and within large corporations it creates conflicts between worker-side "co-managers" and their opponents (Rehder 2006) . Second, elsewhere, conflict between labor and management has intensified, as unions have responded to employer moves to avoid workplace-level worker representation (as at the supermarket chain Lidl -see http://www.verdi-blog.de/lidl) or fragment collective bargaining (as in the public sector - Bispinck 2006) . Much has been written on the first trend, less on the second. This paper examines the case of Hamburg's municipal hospitals, where unions have tried both cooperation and contention in response to intensified competition. Although trade unionists accept the need for private capital and reduced costs, their channels of influence have largely disappeared. As a result, they have turned away from social partnership and mobilized workers and citizens of Hamburg around protecting public services and jobs, shifting to a strategy that resembles what scholars have begun to call social movement unionism.
At issue is a change in how worker representatives have participated in hospital restructuring since the mid 1990s. For Hamburg's patients and workers, the stakes have been high: Landesbetrieb Krankenhäuser (LBK) was the city's second largest employer, after Airbus, and controlled half of the city's hospital beds. The story begins in 1995 when the government announced a program to rationalize the hospitals, including the formation of LBK. It ends in 2007 with a collective agreement over the terms of a handover of LBK to a private firm, Asklepios, and, not incidentally, the revitalization of the union. Between these two events is a turning point, the 2001 defeat of the Social Democrats in local elections, which undermined the union's channels of influence over workplace restructuring.
In Germany, as ruling political parties and employers lose their interest in social partnership, union strategies are changing. German unions, like their colleagues elsewhere, are not just embedded in industrial relations institutions, but also in other social relations, such as local politics and civil society. These additional channels of influence and power resources can be attractive to unions seeking alternatives to the eroding industrial relations system. Looking at Interviews were semi-structured: while they covered a shared set of issues, questions changed along with events and as specific categories emerged as important. While the most detailed research took place Hamburg, interviews were also conducted in Berlin (the site of the national union office), Stuttgart, Chemnitz and Cologne. Hamburg's hospitals were chosen as the main case, for a few reasons. The former LBK is massive (15,000 employees in 1995, 11,000 in 2007) and an important employer and provider of public services. Despite their importance, hospitals are under-researched: what we know about German industrial relations is based primarily on large manufacturing firms. For a researcher, it helps that the press, academics, consultants and managers have documented the restructuring there and made their writings publicly available, and that the individuals on nearly all sides of the dispute i agreed to be interviewed for this study.
Most importantly, the case did not fit the usual image of German trade unionism and therefore seemed productive in showing the limits of mainstream theory. The other cities were chosen to reflect diversity within Germany: the conservative and affluent southwest (Stuttgart), the social democratic Rhineland (Cologne) and the crisis-ridden east (Berlin and Chemnitz).
This paper begins with a discussion of why industrial relations theorists view social movement unionism as unlikely in Germany. The following section describes the rise of labormanagement-government cooperation in Hamburg, the changes in industrial relations, the health care system and local politics that disrupted these old arrangements, and the emergence of social movement unionism after 2001. Next is a comparison of hospital restructuring and industrial relations in four other large cities in order to assess generalizability. Finally, it assesses international comparative explanations of trade unionism in light of the argument and cases, especially the U.S.-German contrast that has so deeply influenced institutional theory.
Industrial relations theory and the likelihood of social movement unionism in Germany
Scholars generally view it as unlikely the German unions would behave like social movements. The term, social movement unionism, has been used as a vision of international solidarity (e.g. Moody 1997) and to describe more local forms of mobilization, mainly in the U.S. (e.g. Johnston 1994 ). Steven Lopez defines social movement unionism within the latter tradition, as a type of trade union that develops genuine community coalitions, grassroots worker mobilization and recruitment outside the usual tool of the strike, and frames issues in terms of social justice rather than the interests of the workers involved (2004: 12-13) . It is this kind of innovation, others have argued, that is stifled by the institutional embeddedness of German unions (Baccaro, Hamann and Turner 2003; Frege and Kelly 2004) .
German unions, according to this line of reasoning, have relatively unchallenged roles in the national political economy. Since the 1980s, Germany's "neo-corporatist" institutions have attracted the admiration of writers in countries with "pluralist" systems.
ii While Britain suffered from a vicious cycle of distrust, contention and industrial decline, Germany had a virtuous cycle of high wages, high skills, labor peace and economic expansion. While American unions were vulnerable to the vicissitudes of management strategy, with little choice but to act as management's junior partner, German unions participated with strong statutory rights and mobilization capacities. The kind of management offensive led by Reagan and Thatcher never took place in Germany, partly because managers in the large firms that dominated employer associations feared conflict (see Streeck 1992; Turner 1991; Thelen and Kume 2006) .
The advantages that West German industrial relations system conferred on the postwar trade unions can hardly be exaggerated. Collective bargaining agreements covered more than 80% of employees and were very inclusive. For example, the metal and electronics industry agreement negotiated by the union IG Metall covered manufacturers of motor vehicles, auto parts, ships, airplanes, computers, machine tools, and the metals and metal components used to manufacture all of the above. Germany's employers had few exit options, since (1) the employers associations that conducted collective bargaining also provided services to employers such as legal support in the case of a dispute in the workplace and (2) under German law, all members of the associations were bound by the collective agreements they negotiated.
Furthermore, employers did not necessarily want to escape, since negotiating wages at the sectoral level, rather than in the workplace, displaced conflict. Works councils, the in-firm worker representatives, had participation rights of their own, a formal separation from the union, and were not allowed to call strikes. Most works councilors, however, were union members, and many were union activists and recruited members. Although mandatory union membership was illegal, these arrangements helped keep union density above one third of the workforce for most of the postwar period.
Institutional embeddedness, however, had a downside for unions, which became evident as they came under attack. A small number of unified unions (Einheitsgewerkschaften) operated with little competition, with less pressure to compete for members than in pluralist systems of interest representation, such as the U.K. (Hassel 1999) . As non-union employer associations came into being and as high unemployment made workers less willing to strike, unions were increasingly marginalized in their shrinking strongholds of large manufacturing firms. Unions were accused of becoming the representatives of an ever more narrowly defined interest group and of shifting the cost of economic restructuring onto society as a whole through statesubsidized early retirement schemes (Streeck 2001) . In-firm labor-management cooperation tended to subvert the system by intensifying inequality in the labor market, political conflict within the camp of worker representatives (Rehder 2006) , and competition between different parts of the workforce (Doellgast and Greer 2007) . At the same time, because unions had faced relatively little "challenge to [their] legitimate status" and had a "framework of employment law
[that] has remained broadly supportive," they were under little pressure to build coalitions with other organizations in civil society (Frege, Heery and Turner 2004: 146 ).
These problems with institutional embeddedness were discovered during a period of Below, I will argue that because of these changes, institutional theories of union behavior are losing their explanatory power.
Trade unionism and the restructuring of Hamburg's hospitals

Pre-2001: Restructuring under social partnership
In the post-World War II era, the Social Democratic Party (SPD) led Hamburg's local government continuously for 44 years, at times in coalition with the Liberal Democrats or the Greens. Since the SPD had close ties with union leaders, unions received access to government policymaking in the executive branch (a 9-member Senate, led by an Erster Bürgermeister) and the legislative branch (the 120-member Bürgerschaft). As in other regions, public sector managers tended to be members of political parties, including the SPD, giving trade unions channels of influence above the minimum statutory requirement.
In some ways, the state-owned part of the health care system fits the standard picture of German industrial relations. Centralized trade unions, employers associations and collective bargaining cover the whole public sector, and tripartite bodies govern hospital financing. In the mid-1990s, Hamburg's municipal hospitals were targeted for modernization. City councilors argued that the hospitals were not efficient enough to cope with pressures from the conservative federal government and the cash-strapped local health insurance funds.
Government and management announced a cost reduction goal of DM 200 million, along with plans to close a historic hospital, the Hafenkrankenhaus. The latter move sparked an occupation of the building by union and community activists, which culminated in a negotiated solution.
The deal was worked out by unionists, works councils, managers and politicians, mostly affiliated with the SPD, with the goal of finding efficiencies and preventing mandatory redundancies. A new works council had just been elected to replace a more militant group, and they viewed "trusting cooperation" (vertrauensvolle Zusammenarbeit) as more productive than confrontation. LBK's personnel director, Heinz Lohmann, an SPD member, was in charge of negotiating with worker representatives over the effects of restructuring. SPD politiciansincluding the head of the DGB, Erhard Pumm, who sat on the city council -wrote and passed the enabling legislation for the new LBK. This common affiliation, and this common belief in using collective bargaining and legislation to modernize the hospitals, led to a typical, German-style compromise for "socially tolerable" cost cutting. A complex set of rules emerged to regulate work in the new organization, including a "cooperation contract" specifying a structure of committees and information rights to steer change. The government passed a law specifying LBK's organizational structure and securing, among other things, priority hiring elsewhere in
Hamburg's public sector for workers leaving LBK.
Documentation of these changes by managers (Schütte 2004 ) and worker representatives (Brueckner-Bozetti and Schweizer 2000) show that these agreements allowed LBK managers to reduce costs in several ways. The union agreed to accept the closure of the Hafenkrankenhaus and headcount reductions of 3000 out of 15,000 workers in exchange for a "right of return" (i.e.
privileged access to work elsewhere in Hamburg's public sector) and detailed consultations over restructuring. With the support of outside consultants, the works council hoped to reduce the cuts and prevent mandatory redundancies.
Management's goal was to reduce costs by 15%. In consultation with the union, they reorganized support services into separate subsidiaries, some as joint ventures with outside firms.
LBK set up 100%-owned subsidiaries in charge of cleaning, pharmacy and laundry, as well as several "service firms" in which functions like buying, logistics, facilities management and training were concentrated on a single site within the organizational structure. While most these areas remained within the sectoral agreement, the combining of redundant capacities across the hospitals allowed management to reduce employment numbers. Eventually, they reached their goal of 3000 fewer employees, mainly through attrition.
National trends in hospital industrial relations
Much of what eventually happened in Hamburg -the downsizing, restructuring and privatization, and the demands to deviate from national-sectoral collective bargaining -was not unusual. Between 1991 and 2005, the number of for-profit hospitals increased by 59%, while the number of government-owned hospitals declined by 28%, and the total number of hospitals declined by 11% (Anonymous 2007b) . Consulting firm Arthur Andersen has predicted that by 2010 nearly a third of all hospitals will be for-profit, and the number of public hospitals would, between 2000 and 2010, decline by more than half (cited in Leonhardt, 2000: 106) . In the four years leading up to 2005, the share of public hospitals spun off from the city administration and given a private legal form -most commonly, a GmbH, or limited liability company -increased from 28% to 44%. Hospitals began doing more with less: between 1991 and 2005, the number of "cases" increased by 16%, while staff numbers decreased by 3% (Anonymous 2007b) .
Attempts by Hamburg's politicians and managers to restructure the workplace have also been in line with industry trends. The outsourcing of services via subsidiary arrangements has become a common way for management to reduce headcounts, find partners with investment capital and expertise, and get tax advantages (Nagel, Haslinger and Meurer, 2002: pp. 120-154) .
Furthermore, employers have become increasingly willing to question collective bargaining.
The chair of the German hospital association argued in a series of articles that changes in the political economy are forcing change in management practices. Without loosening job security rules, extending working times, introducing more low-wage work and introducing other forms of flexibility, he argues, more hospitals will leave the employers association (e.g. Rocke 2003 ).
The drive for cost cutting has intensified as a reimbursement scheme introduced in 2002, known as Diagnostic Related Groups (DRGs), has taken effect. Under DRGs, insurers -the most important of which are semi-public funds governed by labor and management representatives -pay a standard rate for a given condition, independent of the amount of time in the hospital or the hospital's costs. This helps insurers reduce expenditures by making hospital processes more transparent and comparable and by rewarding efficient hospitals, but will also drive inefficient hospitals into insolvency (Schütte 2004; Völpel-Haus 2003) .
These reforms have taken place as public sector industrial relations have become increasingly disorganized. Though the formal structure of bargaining remains in place, employee and employer camps have fragmented, public enterprises have begun to exit from the employers association, and privatization and outsourcing have become pervasive. In 2003, the city-state of Berlin, whose left-wing coalition government, facing severe debt, negotiated an agreement with ver.di to leave the national framework and reduce pay and working time by 10%.
Shortly thereafter, the association of state governments left national bargaining. Bolstered by lower union density, the states demanded a greater increase in working time than that sought by municipal and federal governments (Bispinck 2006) .
At the same time, the employees' side has been fragmenting. In earlier strikes, such as the one in 1992, the union could strike the public infrastructure of mass transit, harbors, and garbage collection. By 2006, many of these enterprises were privatized, covered by separate public-sector agreements or susceptible to strike breakers (ibid).
iii Furthermore, the Marburger Bund walked out of national bargaining in September 2005, and struck against the Land-owned clinics, with a demand for a 30% pay increase. Ver.di refused to support the physicians, preferring instead wage moderation and compression. In response, the physicians announced the creation of a new health care union to end ver.di's "dictatorship" (Die Welt, 8 August 2006 ).
In early 2006, in the wake of this fragmentation and the 2005 renegotiation of the overall public sector bargaining framework, a 14-week strike took place, the longest national public sector strike in German history. Ver.di made minor concessions over working time in order to bring the states back into bargaining and retain national bargaining. However, the new framework is a crazy quilt of rules, depending on the state and on sector-specific sideagreements known as Spartentarifverträge (Bispinck 2006) .
In this context, social partnership in Hamburg proved brittle.
Post-2001: Local political change
As LBK was being restructured, local politics were also in upheaval. Deindustrialization In principle, worker representatives did want to obstruct change. The same works councilors had worked for years in "trusting cooperation" to reduce costs and agreed in principal to allowing private financing. However, the Senate's health care and public finance experts had little time for their alternative ideas and their offers to negotiate. On the one-year anniversary of ver.di's formation, its new local leader, Wolfgang Rose, announced its new anti-privatization campaign, cementing, as central to its identity, its resistance to policies of the CDU-led Senate.
With an organizational density of around 10% at LBK and a legal prohibition of political strikes, the union was in no position to take industrial action. However, trade unionists suspected that public opinion was against privatization, and that a public campaign would have a positive resonance in the news media. Despite cash flow problems due to overall membership decline, the union spent €360,000 on the campaign. Rose viewed campaigning as a way to get around workplace-level union weakness, strengthen ver.di's public credibility, and increase membership and involvement (Boehlke 2005 
The vote and afterwards
In late 2003, the Schill party collapsed, and a Bürgerschaft election was called. This crisis in the government took place as the bill to privatize LBK was passing through the council. Why did social movement unionism replace co-management as the union strategy in Hamburg's hospitals? For LBK's workers and their representatives, the problem was not that a neo-liberal government had replaced a traditional one: social democrats and conservatives both advocated market-oriented reforms of health care and the public sector, and ver.di felt it could live with much of this agenda. The conservative Senate and the new employer Asklepios had a new strategy for making hospitals adapt to intensified competition. Using the language of strategic choice theory (Walton, Cutcher-Gershenfeld and McKersie, 1994) , social democrats preferred to foster change, while conservatives preferred to force it. In pursuing privatization, the Senate pushed worker representatives out of their social partnership role and into one of organizing resistance. Rather than working together in joint programs to experiment and re-make worker participation like the SPD Senate, the conservatives have shifted public sector industrial relations into a battlefield logic (see Behrens and Jacoby, 2004) . As a result, the organs of co-determination changed their purpose to one of intensive deal-making between the state, the employer and the union, to one of information provision for a works council and local union under fire. The union shifted from an "insider" position with good access to elite decision making to an "outsider" position, excluded from government and management decisions (see Turner and Cornfield 2007: introduction) . Table one sketches the change in Hamburg.
Hospital restructuring and union responses beyond Hamburg
The previous section described how the strategy of a large union in a single city changed in response to neo-liberal reforms threatening its public-sector membership. This section will discuss four other cities and two features of the regions that shape variations in union responses.
One variable, union inclusion versus exclusion, was important in Hamburg: when local elites began to exclude unions from decision-making, social movement unionism became more of an option for organized labor. A second variable, economic crisis versus stability, was relatively unimportant in this change, mainly because Hamburg's economy has been relatively stable. In East Germany, unemployment has been much higher and fiscal pressures on government more intense; these economic pressures also made mobilization difficult. A comparison of municipal clinic restructuring in four large cities (Stuttgart, Cologne, Chemnitz, and Berlin) suggests that social movement unionism requires, not only the loss of old channels of influence, but also some amount of economic stability (table two) . The result was initially a pledge by the city council to consider the unions' suggestions and, after other demonstrations, the union has become increasingly involved in detailed negotiations around the details of restructuring. Co-management in the sense of pre-2001 LBK, however, seems unlikely, after the bitter struggle between ver.di and the city during the 2006 strike.
In Cologne, a relatively stable service-based economy, campaigning has been less intense, because the union has had more opportunities for influence, and the campaigning that has taken place has fed into a pattern of strong co-management. In 2001, the SPD was voted out of office due to a corruption scandal, and was replaced by a conservative-liberal coalition. For a brief period in 2002, ver.di used public demonstrations to make its case to the public concerning the creation of a semi-autonomous city-owned hospital corporation. Due to a change in the government's junior partner (the liberals were replaced by the greens as the CDU's junior partner) and the choice of a conservative trade unionist as administrative director, the union called off the campaign and was able to make an agreement strengthening co-determination in the new organization.
The eastern city of Chemnitz is a stark contrast. Here, worker representation in municipal hospitals has fallen back into a social work function. During the 1990s, unemployment rose dramatically in the wake of a general collapse of East German industry; after 1997 the unemployment rate fluctuated between 17% and 20% (compared to the low teens in
Hamburg and Cologne and 6%-10% in Stuttgart) (Anonymous 2007a 
Explaining change and variation in Germany
The rise of campaigning is connected to a broader transformation of public sector industrial relations and the German political economy. Employers in the public and private sectors are seeking increased flexibility and reduced costs, sometimes by abandoning preexisting patterns of cooperation and negotiation with unions. Some politicians and government agencies are also shedding their old ties to unions. Because of this breakdown of neo-corporatism, "insider unionism" (Turner and Cornfield, 2006: introduction) is becoming increasingly ineffective or impossible, leading some unions to take on the characteristics of social movements. Hamburg is a case where ver.di has done so in response to privatization.
The dominant strand of comparative industrial relations makes an institutional argument that social movement unionism is unlikely in Germany (Baccaro 2003; Frege and Kelly 2004) .
Why do the cases above tell a different story? Germany is losing these special characteristics, partly due to the decline of unions (in terms of membership, political power and bargaining power) and partly due to political and economic pressures. In public hospitals, there is a consensus across the political parties that quality service can only be sustained through more involvement by the private sector. This can take the form of joint ventures, the spinning off of hospitals into separate public corporations or privatization. Whatever the choice, unions face demands to deviate from collectively bargained norms and therefore have to choose between quiescence, co-management, or social movement unionism.
Because of decisions made by politicians and administrators, in German hospitals, neocorporatist action does not necessarily follow from neo-corporatist structure. While Lucio Baccaro finds process of social partnership in countries without corporatist institutional structures (2003, p. 683) , in Germany we currently see the reverse: while the quasi-corporatist institutional structure remains formally intact, the process of social partnership is breaking down.
As employers have broken with old patterns of cooperation, ver.di has sought alternative forms of leverage. The breaking ranks of employers that led to the 2005 strike, the defection of Berlin's government and Hamburg's hospitals from the public sector framework and derecognition of collective bargaining by hospitals elsewhere all play a role. Ver.di corresponds less and less to the image of an institutionally embedded German trade union, with a public status secured by institutions, and more like a pluralist actor, changing its goals and pursuing Page 23 them through mobilization or through co-management, in an experimental way. Although the case of Hamburg's hospitals confirms that the state matters in industrial relations (Godard, 2002) , the public policies and employer strategies in Hamburg are similar to those seen in "liberal market economies."
As these arrangements break down and mobilizations outside of this system become more visible and important, it is worth asking why this change and within-country differentiation is taking place. One reason for the disorganization of Germany, suggested by the change over time exists on how the economic crisis in the East has affected industrial relations, leading to the establishment of the dual system there, but in a weaker form, highly susceptible, once again, to concession bargaining, or even the derecognition of bargaining, partly because of the pressure that the threat of unemployment puts on workers (Artus 2001) . Furthermore, in public sector industrial relations, the literature on change has shown that fiscal pressure on states, especially due to debt, is forcing states to change their policies (Schulten and Dribbusch 2004 appealing to the common framework of goals and procedures institutionalized by an industrial relation system, ver.di in Hamburg has begun to work on a less certain terrain, in a more contentious manner. They rely not so much on regularized channels of influence or well-tested sources of power, but rather on an experimental search for new levers. This experimentation involves finding issues that appeal to the broader public, especially in health care and the public sector. In the battle in Hamburg against privatization, ver.di and the works council appealed to two main goals beyond job retention and worker well-being: local democracy and the state's role in providing for basic human needs. This experimentation, however, can also involve mobilizing or finding insider channels of influence, as in Berlin and Cologne. Sometimes, like in Chemnitz and Berlin, high unemployment makes it difficult to mobilize the workforce; in Hamburg, Cologne and Stuttgart, the union has had more ability to mobilize people. In Cologne, Berlin and (pre-2001) Hamburg, the union had channels of influence that led to demobilization, as trade unionists took on a role in cutting the workforce and speeding up work. Union ability and willingness to organize resistance thus depends not just on the country, but also on region-specific factors, such as local economic conditions and political constellations in local government.
Conclusion: the disembedding of German trade unions
The purpose of this paper has been to contest the image of German unions as constrained by a formerly favorable institutional framework. In the case of Hamburg's hospitals, a campaign has taken place that corresponds to definitions of social movement unionism derived from the U.S.
experience. While the union failed to stop privatization, it succeeded in repeatedly embarrassing the Senate and the employer in public, setting up new relations of cooperation with local civil society, preventing the employer from breaking with the framework of public sector collective bargaining, and revitalizing its activist structures and membership in the workplace. This is hardly a case of shoring up traditional German social partnership through conflict. The campaign has been about blocking neo-liberal reforms, and there is little sign that contention could lead to more union influence over the details of restructuring in the workplace or its political-economic causes.
While social movement unionism depends on region-specific factors, it needs to be emphasized that the national level also matters. Hospital restructuring emanates from the nation state and national political parties, via the statutory insurance funds. While social movement unionism can address the workplace-level effects by mobilizing against the local elites who make decisions about health care provision, local campaigners have no way to address the national political changes behind the changes. Their attempted "mixed form" campaign to link local struggles over restructuring with national attempts to influence health care reform was a failure (ver.di 2003) .
This analysis is not universally generalizable, even if it does fit a wide range of evidence from large municipal hospitals. It matters that the struggle is over a public good, health care, and took place (initially) in the public sector. In Hamburg, the goods at stake in the hospitals are fundamentally different from those at the city's other large employer, Airbus. This is not to say that German industrial relations institutions are sufficient for worker representation in a large metalworking firm: mobilization and political action have been important there, as well. But
Airbus workers have rallied around much more "economistic" demands, mainly job security, and have had to overlook the costs to the environment and the public purse. While ver.di has built a broad coalition (including both attac and the Patriotic Society of 1765), the coalition for Airbus expansion has mainly involved elites, often in conflict with other parts of civil society, such as environmentalists and property owners (Greer 2007 ).
Without proposing a German "model" or "variety" of social movement unionism, at least three U.S.-German differences emerge from the stories. One has to do with LBK being within the public sector. While government employees in the US organized around broad social goals that, they argued, the government should pursue, this came at a time of expansion, rather than retrenchment. Johnston (1994) shows that social movement unionism in California's public sector quieted down in the 1980s, as the government came under fire from the tax revolt and politics as a whole lurched to the right. In Hamburg, by contrast, ver.di has begun using social movement tactics to fight retrenchment.
A second difference has to do with the process of union strategizing. Voss and Sherman (2000) argue that unions adopt new organizing policies when new leaders emerge with experience outside trade unionism and where national unions step in to implement organizing policies. Like the organizing unions in that study, ver.di in Hamburg is in crisis and looking for alternatives. But far from waiting for the national union to step in, the initiative came from the local level, and from activists and staff with little experience in other social movements. Ver.di has had few layoffs and no overall vision of organizing to implement in its local units.
A third difference has to do with the lack of mandatory union membership in Germany, which creates a special tension between labor-management cooperation and union vitality. US industrial relations rules allow mandatory union membership, while in Germany union membership is always officially voluntary. Unlike their American counterparts, local German unions that participate in painful, unpopular reforms tend to lose members, activists, and (potentially) even control of works councils. Conversely, in situations of struggle, union membership tends to increase, as it has in Hamburg's privatized hospitals.
This article has shown what scholars call social movement unionism does indeed exist in Germany and has sketched the conditions under which it emerges in municipal hospitals. It also raises other questions that will require future research. How does the big picture of trade union strategy in Germany really compare with that in the English-speaking world? Will German unions recover their vitality through social movement tactics, or are these measures too limited, too short-term, and too defensive? Does participation inevitably lead to demobilization, or are there conditions under which it can fit into a unions' strategy to mobilize workers? Asking questions like these would inject realism into the picture of "social Europe" among industrial relations scholars and shed light on the workings of union renewal and decline more generally. 
